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Abstract Building, restoring and maintaining well-placed trust 
between scientists and the public is a difficult yet crucial social task 
requiring the successful cooperation of various social actors and 
institutions. Philip Kitcher’s (2011) takes up this challenge in the 
context of liberal democratic societies by extending his ideal model of 
“well-ordered science” that he had originally formulated in his (2001). 
However, Kitcher nowhere offers an explicit account of what it means 
for the public to invest epistemic trust in science. Yet in order to 
understand how his extended model and its implementation in the 
actual world address the problem of trust as well as to evaluate it 
critically, an explicit account of epistemic public trust in science needs 
to be given first. In this article we first present such an account and 
then scrutinize his project of building public trust in science in light of 
it. We argue that even though Kitcher’s ideal model and his proposals 
for its implementation in the real world face a number of problems, 
they can be addressed with the resources of our account. 
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Scientific expertise has a crucial role to play in dealing with many of 
the challenges our societies face from health policy to addressing 
climate change. Yet, liberal democratic societies are thought to 
experience significant distrust of expertise (Drezner 2017; Gauchat 
2012; Nichols 2017). This has placed questions of trust in science firmly 
on the agenda not only of scientists (ALLEA 2018; Resnick, Sawyer, 
and Huddleston 2015), but also philosophers of science (Douglas 2009; 
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Grasswick 2010; Kitcher 2011; Wilholt 2013). The latter emphasize that 
science is in the pursuit not of any truths but significant truths and 
that the acceptance of hypotheses involves trade-offs regarding 
inductive risk, both of which are influenced by social and moral 
values. Granting the role of such values in science raises the question 
of “whose values”? If the values guiding science are not shared by the 
public, the public’s trust may not be forthcoming. How can we then 
incorporate people’s values in science to build trust? What exactly 
does public’s investing trust in science involve? The aim of this article 
is to pursue these questions largely, though not exclusively, within the 
framework of “well-ordered science” developed by Philip Kitcher. 
Kitcher has long been arguing that if science is to promote the 
collective good, it should pursue those ends (from agenda setting to 
their applications) that would be agreed upon through a process of 
hypothetical democratic deliberation by ideal deliberators tutored by 
scientists. The hypothetical nature of Kitcher’s model of well-ordered 
science has been the subject of sustained criticism. A number of 
philosophers have forcefully argued that since we are not in a position 
to know its outcome, it cannot generate well-grounded substantive 
recommendations (Brown 2013; Douglas 2013). Others have rightly 
pointed out that arguments for actual democratic deliberation do not 
carry over to ideal democratic deliberation (Keren 2013). Finally, 
Kitcher has also been criticized for not offering any suggestions as to 
how his model can be applied in practice (Hausman 2003). While we 
concede the force of these criticisms, we see merit in further 
engagement with his work for two reasons. First, in (Kitcher 2011) he 
does offer some practical proposals for approximating his ideal 
through Fishkin style deliberative polling. Although this goes some 
way towards addressing the criticisms above, critics have for the most 
part ignored his proposals.1 Second, Kitcher (2011) contains a number 
of significant revisions to his original model developed in (Kitcher 
2001), and they are foremost aimed at rebuilding public trust. To our 
knowledge, how his revised model, when combined with his practical 
                                                 
1 Notable exceptions are (Brown 2013 and Wilholt 2014).  
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proposals, tackles the problem of public trust in science has not 
received the attention it deserves. Hence, engaging with Kitcher’s 
views for building and maintaining public trust in science is, we 
believe, instructive in its own right. 
Even though epistemic public trust in science occupies a central place 
in his ( 2011), Kitcher’s conception of it remains implicit throughout. 
Yet in order to understand how his revised model and its 
implementation in the actual world address the problem of trust as 
well as to evaluate it critically, an explicit account of epistemic public 
trust in science needs to be given first. Accordingly, we present such 
an account in Sect. 1. In Sect. 2 we provide our interpretation of 
Kitcher’s suggestions for building public trust in science in light of our 
account. In Sect. 3 we evaluate Kitcher’s model and his proposals for 
its implementation. We argue that they face a number of problems and 
suggest how they can be addressed with the resources of our account. 
1 An Account of Epistemic Public Trust in Science 
“Public trust in science” is an ambiguous expression as “public” and 
“science” can refer to different things. Moreover, the object of trust is 
usually left implicit. First, “public” can refer to collective bodies acting 
on behalf of the public, such as the courts or ministries, or it can refer 
to individuals making up the public. Second, “science” can refer to 
scientific methods, to individual scientists or groups of scientists, or to 
their social organization. Third, the object of trust can be the 
information provided by scientists, or it can be the consequences of 
scientific activities more broadly conceived.2 
In this paper we shall assume that members of the public have a 
certain level of trust in science as a whole as a way of obtaining 
knowledge about the world.  Drawing on our previous work (Irzik 
                                                 
2 This last difference is picked out by survey questions asking members of the public 
whether they have confidence that scientists “act in the best interests of the public” 
and trust scientists “to give full and accurate information” about certain topics. For 
an example see The PEW Research Center’s report (Funk and Kennedy 2016).  
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and Kurtulmus, forthcoming) we will present in this section some 
necessary conditions for the public’s placing warranted epistemic 
trust in a scientist or a group of scientists as providers of information. 
For this reason, our account does not apply to those who reject tout 
court scientific methods and practices.3 Even if trust in scientific 
methods and the organization of science is assumed, the question of 
trust in individual scientists or groups of scientists remains important. 
We cannot assume that scientists have always employed scientific 
methods and procedures correctly. While the incentive structure of 
science makes scientists more likely to be careful in their research and 
truthful, this is far from a guarantee. Moreover, our trust in the 
maintenance of this incentive structure assumes that there are 
scientists who are trustworthy as individuals and act in light of a set 
of ethical values. Finally, when a novel claim has been made or there 
is disagreement among scientists about a particular issue, our trust in 
scientific methods and the organization of science will not settle the 
matter. We will need to make decisions about the trustworthiness of 
individual scientists. 
We also underline at the outset that we are concerned with warranted 
epistemic trust, not with a socio-psychological account of why public 
trust or distrust scientists. By warranted epistemic trust we mean well-
placed epistemic trust: trust with good grounds invested in those 
scientists with the required qualities for being trustworthy. The idea 
of warranted trust also resonates well with Kitcher’s well-ordered 
science as a normative ideal.  
We find it useful to distinguish between qualitatively two different 
types of trust: basic and enhanced. 
Basic trust. Let M be a member of the public, S stand for a scientist or 
a body of scientists, and P be a proposition or a group of propositions. 
                                                 
3 This restriction in the scope of our account is in line with Kitcher’s approach. See 
Kitcher (2011, pp. 155-168). 
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Then in order for M to place warranted basic epistemic trust in S as a 
provider of P, the following conditions are necessary: 
(C1) S believes that P and communicates it to M 
honestly, 
(C2) M takes the fact that S believes and has 
communicated that P to be a (strong but defeasible) 
reason to believe that P, 
(C3) P is the output of reliable scientific research carried 
out by S, and 
(C4) M relies on S because she has good reasons to 
believe that P is the output of such research and that S 
has communicated P honestly. 
Several clarifications are needed. First, a piece of scientific research 
that yields P is reliable if it is carried out according to methodological 
standards that make the objective probability of P’s being true 
sufficiently high (Goldman 1986). Second, we can move from M’s trust 
to the public’s as follows: the relevant public will be said to invest 
warranted epistemic trust in S as a provider of P when a sufficient 
number of its members invest warranted epistemic trust in S as a 
provider of P. Our formulation refers to the relevant public because 
the boundaries of “the public” are determined contextually and 
usually left implicit. Finally, while (C1) and (C3) spell out the 
necessary conditions for S to be trustworthy, (C2) and (C4) specify the 
necessary conditions for M to trust S and do so with good reasons. 
What is essential for the existence of trust as opposed to mere reliance 
is both the requirement of honesty in C1 and the requirement that it is 
S’s communication (and not just S’s belief) which is a reason for M’s 
belief that P. Trust differs from reliance in two crucial respects. First, 
it involves dependence on the good will of another person (Baier 1986, 
pp. 234-5). Second, when the person trusted fails to live up to the trust 
entrusted in them, this gives rise to reactive attitudes such as feelings 
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of betrayal and resentment (Holton 1994, pp. 66-7). When we take 
what a scientist has told us as a reason to believe the claim they are 
making, we take them to be honest, thus displaying some level of good 
will towards us. It is not the case that we only assume the incentives 
to tell the truth is what guides their action. If that were the case, we 
would not feel betrayed if  we found out they had lied to us.4  
Recall that S can be an individual scientist or a group of scientists such 
as a research team or a body like the IPCC. The requirement of honest 
communication implies that S has beliefs, which in turn implies that 
groups can have beliefs. This point requires two clarifications 
regarding our account. First, our account is intended to be neutral 
between summative accounts of group beliefs, which require that a 
group has a belief that P only if all or most of its members believe that 
P, and non-summative accounts that reject this requirement (Gilbert 
1987, p. 186). That is, we set aside metaphysical questions regarding 
the reducibility or irreducibility of collective intentional attitudes to 
individual ones. For our account to be applicable to groups, only the 
following conditions need to obtain: Groups can have beliefs, aims 
and desires and can make assertions, and furthermore we can evaluate 
their competence and sincerity. Second, successful epistemic 
collaboration within groups depends on group members placing 
warranted trust in other group members. Individuals who are 
deciding whether to place trust in the claims made by such a group do 
not need to decide whether to trust each individual member. Instead, 
they can rely on the following principle:  
Transmission of warranted trust principle: If (a) S1 has 
placed warranted basic epistemic trust in S2 as a 
provider of P and (b) M has a strong reason to believe 
that (a) obtains in light of facts about S1 and S1’s conduct, 
then M has warranted basic epistemic trust in S2 as a 
provider of P.  
                                                 
4 For further discussion, see Irzık and Kurtulmus (forthcoming). 
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This principle holds not only for members of research groups but 
generally. Thus, for instance, if a journalist has well-placed trust in a 
scientist and if their readers know that the journalist would have taken 
due care in placing her trust, then they can also trust the scientist.  
Enhanced trust. Since there is always an inductive gap between a 
hypothesis and evidence, every scientific hypothesis is vulnerable to 
two types of error known as inductive risks (see Rudner 1953; Douglas 
2000 and 2009). One may accept a hypothesis as true even though it is 
false, or one may reject it as false even though it is true. Both Rudner 
and Douglas argue that social and moral values can legitimately 
influence scientists’ methodological standards that determine the 
threshold of evidence needed for the acceptance or rejection of the 
hypothesis in view of the consequences of its inductive risks. Suppose 
now that either risk has serious consequences for the public. If 
scientists (S) make their methodological decisions in line with the 
public’s assessments of inductive risks, and moreover if the public has 
good reasons to believe that S have indeed done so, then they would 
certainly invest further (over and above basic) trust in S. Hence, two 
further conditions can be added to our earlier account: 
(C5) When public welfare is at stake, S make their 
methodological decisions regarding the distribution of 
inductive risks with respect to P in agreement with M’s 
assessments of those risks, and 
(C6) M has good reasons to believe that Condition 5 is 
satisfied. 
Basic epistemic trust plus these two conditions yield public’s 
(warranted) enhanced epistemic trust in science. 
Condition 5 in effect says that for there to be enhanced trust the social 
and moral values of the scientists and the public should more or less 
match with respect to the distribution of inductive risks regarding P, 
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but only when public welfare is at stake.5 However, it is not enough 
that there is a value match. Members of the public should also have 
reason to think that this is indeed the case, and that’s what Condition 
6 says. 
The difference between basic and enhanced trust can be highlighted 
with a hypothetical example from a slightly different context. Suppose 
that I have some money I am considering to invest. I hear about a new 
venture and wonder whether it is a good investment. I ask three 
people for advice. All three say that I should invest all of my money 
in the company. However, their credentials and risk profiles are 
different. The first person has no knowledge about such matters. This 
person does not merit basic trust and their advice should have no 
bearing on my decision. The second person has proper credentials, but 
is unlike me in that they are not risk averse. In this case, it would be a 
good idea to invest some but not all of my money in this venture. The 
third person also has proper credentials. Moreover, they are, like me, 
risk averse. In this case it makes sense for me to invest all of my money 
in this venture. The first person exemplifies the absence of trust. The 
second case exemplifies a case with basic trust, and the third a case 
with enhanced trust. This hypothetical example shows that there is 
indeed a conceptual and practical difference between basic trust and 
enhanced trust – a difference that does translate into different 
behaviors.  
In cases where human welfare is at stake and enhanced trust is absent, 
basic trust is second-best and preferable to the total absence of trust. 
The existence of basic trust means that scientists who issue a certain 
                                                 
5 This qualification is necessary because when inductive risks are not relevant to the 
public, they need not play a role in the public’s trust. However, this introduces a 
complication: research that does not appear to be relevant to the public’s welfare 
may later turn out to be relevant. Thus, there may be cases when we, as individuals, 
mistakenly assume that considerations of enhanced trust are irrelevant. Such errors 
on our part are unavoidable. Nevertheless, judgments regarding trust are not made 
once and for all. We can revise our judgments about trust in the light of new 
information and correct our errors.  
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claim have carried out reliable research. Thus, this gives the public 
reason to believe their claim and act on it. But as this example 
illustrates, the public’s actions will not be solely based on the 
information offered. They will also include precautions against risks 
that the research has not fully taken into account. 
At this point, it is useful to note the following feature of our account: 
it includes internalist as well as externalist elements. Both basic and 
enhanced trust are warranted only if they are placed in people worthy 
of such trust and in light of good reasons. It entails that warrant for 
trust depends on both the truster and the trustee. This does not point 
to a problem with our account; rather, it underscores the difficulty of 
successful relationships of trust. Our trust would not be well-placed if 
the person we trusted was unreliable. Similarly, if we chose whom to 
trust randomly, our trust would not be well-placed even if the person 
we trusted turned out to be trustworthy.6  
 
2 Well-ordered science: From promoting collective good to restoring 
public trust  
Kitcher (2001) finds the current social organization of science in many 
affluent democracies unsatisfactory because research priorities and 
their applications are determined jointly by scientists and a privileged 
group of ‘paymasters’ with the funds to support them in a way in 
which the values and the interests of less privileged groups of people 
tend to be neglected (Kitcher 2001, 127ff; Flory and Kitcher 2004; and 
Reiss and Kitcher 2009). The ideal of well-ordered science aims to 
overcome this shortcoming of the existing social organization of 
science by taking into account the perspectives and values of all 
groups in scientific agenda setting and the allocation of resources to 
them. In this way, Kitcher argues, collective good will be promoted. 
                                                 
6 We thank one of the anonymous referees for urging us to clarify this aspect of our 
account.  
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By contrast, Kitcher (2011) focuses on the loss of public trust in science. 
“My primary thesis” is that, he writes, “scientific authority has been 
eroded in recent decades” (Kitcher 2011, p. 20). He has in mind the 
American people's resistance to the Darwinian account of evolution 
and their skepticism about the safety of genetically modified foods, 
the reality of human induced global warming and the like despite the 
existence of wide scientific consensus with respect to these issues. He 
takes such cases as evidence for decline in public trust in science. He 
cites two major reasons for this: (a) the fact that many people perceive 
certain areas of science (like evolutionary biology and climate science) 
to conflict with their deeply held values and (b) the overambitious and 
often unsubstantiated claim that all questions of major importance can 
eventually be answered by science, a view he calls “scientism”, that 
“stimulate[s] reactions that detract from credibility of more sober 
scientific judgments” (ibid, pp. 16-17). Scientism is seen by ordinary 
citizens as the illegitimate intrusion of scientists' own interests under 
the guise of a value-free science, and, according to Kitcher, that’s “the 
deepest source of the current erosion of the scientific authority” (ibid, 
p. 40). Accordingly, one of the main motivations behind extending the 
scope of his model is to restore public trust in science (Kitcher 2011, 
pp. 30-31, 40, 152, 178, 185-187, and 222-225). Let us see how. 
The central element of Kitcher’s new model is the notion of “the 
system of public knowledge”, science being its most successful part. It 
incorporates a public depository of knowledge and consists of the 
contexts of inquiry, submission, certification, and transmission. 
Whereas the earlier model is solely concerned with the context of 
inquiry, the revised model additionally includes all other contexts of 
the public depository. As in Kitcher (2001), the context of inquiry is 
about determining research agendas and the allocation of resources to 
them. The context of submission is concerned with the questions of 
who is entitled to submit reports to the public depository of 
knowledge and what standards (mostly, ethical) they must meet in 
their investigations. The context of certification deals with the 
methods, procedures and standards for accepting and rejecting 
submitted reports as part of public knowledge. Finally, the context of 
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transmission involves people’s having access to the public depository 
and specifying which applications of public knowledge are to be 
pursued. 
Kitcher now argues that the contexts of inquiry, submission, 
certification, and transmission must all be well-ordered and that the 
system of certification must be ideally transparent. Science would be 
well-ordered when these four contexts are governed by an ideal 
hypothetical deliberative reasoning process carried out by ideal 
deliberators who are representative of all segments of society and who 
are tutored by scientists.7 Ideal transparency, on the other hand, means 
that people see how knowledge claims are accepted into the pool of 
public knowledge. Opening up the context of certification to the 
scrutiny of ideal deliberators and requiring the system of public 
knowledge to be ideally transparent is a radical revision to Kitcher's 
original model and the key to his argument for restoring epistemic 
public trust in science. Let us then look into them carefully. 
Kitcher begins his discussion of the context of certification by noting 
that in order for a piece of research to be certified we need some 
methodological standards that would ensure its reliability (Kitcher 
2011, p. 148). He writes: “The system of public knowledge is expected 
to accord with methodological guidelines that are reliable, in the sense 
that following them would tend to generate correct conclusions... 
Reliable standards and processes are those giving rise to conclusions 
that are true enough, at a frequency that is high enough” (ibid., 148; 
emphasis original).8 This is similar to how we defined reliability in 
Sect. 1. 
How close to truth is close enough and how high is high enough? 
According to Kitcher’s model, the levels of sufficiency will be 
                                                 
7 To be exact, in contrast to the original formulation, the ideal deliberators now 
represent the entire world population and future generations, but for our purposes 
we will focus on a single society. 
8 Kitcher speaks of the system of public knowledge here, but recall that science is its 
most central and successful component. 
  12 
determined by ideal deliberators and scientists collectively in the 
context of certification. The context of certification will be well-
ordered “just in case an ideal deliberation would endorse levels of 
proximity to the truth and of probability of generating truth so that 
both the general methodological standards enunciated and the 
particular judgments extending those explicit standards fall within the 
range of reasonableness determined by those levels” (ibid., p. 149). In 
setting the levels of sufficiency, Kitcher tells us, the deliberation 
should take into account “values of consequences” of research (ibid., 
p. 148). We interpret this to mean taking into account the associated 
inductive risks. It is for this reason that values pervade science not just 
at the agenda setting stage, but also at the very stage of determining 
the threshold for what counts as sufficient evidence for a given 
hypothesis. Turning now to the requirement of transparency, Kitcher 
writes that “a system of public knowledge is ideally transparent just 
in case all people, outsiders as well as researchers, can recognize the 
methods, procedures and judgments used in certification … and can 
accept those methods, procedures and judgments” (ibid., p. 151; our 
emphasis). 
How exactly is all this supposed to address the problem of trust? The 
relationship between public trust in science and a well-ordered and 
ideally transparent system of certification can be seen more clearly in 
light of our analysis. While Kitcher’s model does not include our C1, 
C2 and the transmission of warranted trust principle, it does contain 
requirements that correspond to our conditions C3 and C4. A well-
ordered system of certification implies that research results are based 
on methodological standards and procedures that make their 
probability of being true sufficiently high. An ideally transparent 
system of certification means that the public understands how those 
standards and procedures produce reliable research and accepts them. 
Hence, both reliability and its recognition by the public appear as 
necessary conditions of well-placed trust. Kitcher’s conditions can be 
formulated more explicitly as follows: 
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(K3) Scientific research should be based on reliable 
methodological standards and procedures, and   
(K4) The public must be able to recognize and accept all 
methodological standards and procedures by which 
conclusions of research are included into the pool of 
public knowledge.9 
Moreover, since the methodological standards and procedures are 
decided by taking into account the inductive risks involved, the public 
will see the role played by social and moral values in methodological 
decision making and recognize that the associated criteria adopted 
through ideal deliberation reflect their values as well as those of the 
scientists. As Kitcher puts it, “harmony not only obtains, but is 
recognized as obtaining.” (ibid., p. 151) This can be formulated more 
explicitly in terms of two separate requirements as follows: 
(K5) Methodological decisions about the choice of 
standards and procedures should reflect a harmony 
between the values of the scientists and those of the 
public regarding the distribution of associated inductive 
risks, and 
(K6) The public should be able to see that the value 
harmony mentioned in K5 indeed obtains in light of 
their understanding of the methodological standards 
and procedures employed. 
When these two conditions are satisfied, any suspicion to the effect 
that some claims are accepted simply because they serve scientists’ 
own interests and values will wither away. This will boost trust in 
                                                 
9 This way of numbering is intended to capture the parallel to the conditions in our 
account. 
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science, and, by contrast, any lack of transparency in the system of 
certification will erode it.10 
The similarities between K3-K6 and conditions in our account should 
be obvious, but so should the striking differences. First, while K3 and 
C3 are the same, K5 and C5 are similar but not identical. K5 requires 
that in making their methodological decisions regarding a particular 
issue, scientists should always take into account the consequences of 
error in a way to reflect the values of the citizens. By contrast, C5 
requires that value harmony should obtain only when inductive risks 
bear on public welfare. Indeed, it seems to us that K5 is unnecessarily 
too broad for the purpose of trust building because there is no reason 
to require value harmony in, for example, fundamental research in 
star formation or unified field theory, where it does not matter for the 
public how the inductive risks are distributed. 
It may be thought that K4 cannot be a condition of trust because when 
one is in a position to understand and evaluate the methods behind a 
certain claim there is no role left for trust (Douglas 2013, p. 904). Even 
though there is less dependence on trust when K4 obtains, trust still 
has an important role to play. Scientists are often in this position vis-
à-vis other scientists, yet they need to be able to trust them. For 
                                                 
10 In a recent article Stephen John has offered a critique of the requirement of 
transparency. He uses the negative impact of the leaked emails from Climate 
Research Unit at the University of East Anglia to illustrate his reservations about 
transparency. As John observes, many of the practices that the scientists whose 
emails were hacked engaged in were “normal and respectable” (John 2018, p. 81). 
However, given a set of false background beliefs about how science works, these 
practices were seen as outrageous and undermined trust. In light of these, John 
maintains that non-experts’ epistemic interests would be better served in the absence 
of transparency. Note that he is making a conditional claim: if people have mistaken 
views about how science operates, then transparency is dangerous. Taken as a 
whole, Kitcher’s proposal undermines the antecedent of this conditional. When 
Kitcher’s ideal obtains, people have an accurate understanding of how science 
works. Nevertheless, John is also making a broader point, which is important. Under 
non-ideal conditions transparency can have costs. Thus, when we seek to bring 
about conditions necessary for warranted trust, we should not myopically focus on 
improving only one set of conditions but pursue a more holistic approach. 
  15 
instance, when a laboratory team reports the results of a certain 
experiment, other scientists who are in a position to evaluate the 
team’s methods will still need to trust that they carried out the 
experiment with competence and reported their results truthfully. The 
same point applies to ordinary citizens as well when K4 is satisfied.  
Nevertheless, K4 and K6, drawn from the requirement of 
transparency, are much more demanding than our C4 and C6 and 
indeed impossible to meet in practice, for, as Kitcher himself notes 
(2011, p. 151), no one can recognize all the methods and standards by 
which scientific claims are certified. For the same reason, nor is it 
possible to see that value harmony obtains. Thus, if we insist on K4 
and K6 as necessary conditions for warranted trust, both basic and 
enhanced trust become unattainable. By contrast, as we shall show in 
Sects. 3.1 and 3.4, C4 and C6 are realistic and much easier to satisfy 
since they require from the public only to have good reasons for 
thinking that research is reliable and that value harmony obtains. 
Finally, Kitcher nowhere distinguishes between different types of 
trust such as basic and enhanced trust as we have done. As we shall 
see in the next section, these differences create difficulties for him. 
Kitcher thinks that there are several institutions and practices, such as 
citizens’ panels and juries, that could give substance to his ideal and 
approximate it to some degree. He favors deliberative polling 
developed by James Fishkin and modifies it into a three-stage process. 
At the first stage, the experts should present to a representative group 
of citizens the existing consensus among the scientific community 
about a particular scientific issue along with relevant central concepts, 
methodological procedures and standards of evidence, in short, all the 
major elements of the research that led to the consensus. At the second 
stage, challenges to the consensus should be presented. At the final 
stage, the scientific community should offer their counterarguments 
to the challenges, and the citizens should be “encouraged to press until 
they had resolved their doubts. Only if – and when – full resolution is 
achieved should citizens be prepared to report a unanimous verdict 
on behalf of the scientific consensus” (ibid., p. 225). 
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Suppose now that a sufficient number of representative citizens can 
be tutored in the way envisioned above. Kitcher argues that they can 
then serve as credible witnesses, mediating between the scientific 
community and the larger public (ibid., p. 129). They could share their 
tutored understanding of science with the broader public and then 
report back their experiences. This reiterable mediation would 
provide continued flow of information and dialogue between the 
scientists and the larger public and thus greatly contribute to restoring 
trust in science. 
In short, for the purpose of building or restoring epistemic public trust 
in science, Kitcher proposes a two-step process for approximating his 
ideal in a liberal democratic society. The first step consists of an actual 
deliberative consensus building among a representative group of 
citizens tutored by experts with regard to a given scientific issue. The 
second step consists of the tutored citizens informing the larger public 
about the consensus they have reached. The whole process can be 
reiterated as many times as necessary. 
3 Evaluating Kitcher’s proposals for trust building 
Kitcher’s proposals regarding the building of public trust face a 
number of problems. Below we introduce them and suggest ways of 
addressing them. 
3.1 The Problem of Recognizing Reliability 
In Fishkin-type deliberative polling, the representative citizens are to 
be tutored by experts in such a way that they recognize the evidence, 
methodological standards and procedures that led to the consensus 
about a particular scientific claim. To put it differently, they are to be 
convinced of the reliability of research that underlies the consensus in 
question by acquiring first-order reasons. This is how, according to 
Kitcher, the condition K4 for trust is to be satisfied. We believe this is 
too demanding. While we do not deny that some representative 
citizens can be tutored in this way for some relatively simple scientific 
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claims in a few days or weeks, we doubt that this can be achieved for 
all of them for all scientific issues. Take, for example, the scientific 
consensus that global warming is anthropogenic. Understanding the 
evidence itself and the methods by which they are obtained require 
sophisticated scientific knowledge, which may well be beyond the 
capacity of representative citizens who are not necessarily well-versed 
in climatology. Moreover, even if they can be somehow taught the 
first-order reasons for believing that global warming is human-
induced, it is impossible for the tutored citizens to inform the public 
at large in the same way. Short of all citizens going through exactly the 
same type of deliberation that the representative citizens go through, 
which is practically impossible, the larger public are unlikely to 
understand and assimilate the first-order reasons that the tutored 
citizens have been introduced. 
In view of these facts we propose that instead of the reliability of 
research itself the representative citizens and the larger public can 
judge the trustworthiness of the researchers themselves. To be able to 
do that, they need some criteria which could function as second-order 
reasons. These may include assessing expertise, honesty, and 
epistemic responsibility (see Anderson 2011 and Goldman 2001). 
Criteria for judging expertise reflect a hierarchy of expertise ranging 
from holding a PhD in the relevant field of inquiry to being an expert 
in that field whose work is received well by her peers, all the way up 
to being a leader in the field as indicated by being honored by 
prestigious awards such as the Nobel prize. Those who are higher in 
the ladder of hierarchy should be taken as more trustworthy 
epistemically than those who are lower. As for criteria for judging 
honesty, they include presence or absence of conflicts of interest and 
previous misconduct such as plagiarism, fabricating or suppressing 
crucial data and so on. While their absence is not a reason to trust a 
particular scientist issuing a particular scientific statement, their 
presence is a reason not to trust him with respect to that statement. In 
the case of groups of scientists working together, we can evaluate the 
members of the group individually. A group can also be evaluated as 
a whole, especially in cases where it has formed an organization. For 
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instance, research labs can also have conflicts of interest, be recognized 
by peers for doing good research or have cases of past academic 
dishonesty. Finally, epistemic responsibility can be judged by 
checking whether the researcher publishes in peer-reviewed scientific 
journals, whether she refuses to share data for no good reason, and 
whether she fails to acknowledge or engage with refutations of her 
own claims, and the like. 
Therefore, we suggest that in addition to being informed about the 
first-order reasons, the representative citizens should also be tutored 
about the trustworthiness of scientists who have carried the research 
in question to judge its reliability in an indirect way and then share 
both types of reasons with the rest of the public. Arguably, untutored 
citizens can understand and employ second-order reasons even when 
they fail to master the first-order reasons. Moreover, if the tutored 
citizens come to accept a certain conclusion, that also is a second-order 
reason for the rest of the public to accept it as well. Even though they 
may not appreciate the first-order reasons for the conclusion in 
question, they can assume that had they also been tutored, they would 
come to accept it. Our proposal therefore has a greater chance of 
success in building public trust than Kitcher’s own. 
3.2 The Problem of Trust in Tutors and the Idea of Tutoring 
The success of the Fishkin-type deliberative process crucially depends 
on the existence of a certain degree of initial trust between the 
representative citizens and their tutors. Kitcher simply assumes that 
such a trust base between them already exists. But if there is a serious 
erosion of public trust in science as Kitcher worries, then such an 
assumption appears to be unjustified.11 
Yet trust is not an all or nothing affair, and if the encounter between 
the experts and the representative citizens is structured appropriately, 
then a healthy level of trust between the two groups can be established 
                                                 
11 We thank one of the anonymous referees for raising the challenge of establishing 
trust between the tutors and the representative citizens. 
  19 
during the process. To that end, first, the tutors must be chosen from 
trustworthy experts – a point Kitcher surprisingly neglects. Moreover, 
the tutors should be experts whose trustworthiness is relatively easy 
to observe by the representative citizens. Thus, for instance, they must 
not suffer from conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the representative 
citizens should be provided with second-order reasons regarding their 
trustworthiness. This can be done by providing them with the 
credentials, the institutional affiliations of the experts, and so on. 
Second, Kitcher’s emphasis on one-way tutoring of the representative 
citizens by the experts smacks of indoctrination, which can be an 
obstacle for successful deliberation. Indeed, as some philosophers 
have noted, his entire project of well-ordered science is based on “the 
deficit model” (Brown 2013, p. 394), according to which the public’s 
waning interest in science, their skepticism or outright hostility 
toward it is due to their lack of knowledge and understanding (see 
Kitcher 2011, pp. 128-129 and 187 ff).12 What is needed is a genuinely 
dialogical communication between the participants of the deliberative 
process, where the experts should not only provide the representative 
citizens with up-to-date relevant knowledge, and indeed with the 
scientific consensus if any, about the issue in question, but also try to 
understand their beliefs and values, uptake their valid criticisms and 
address their worries (Goldenberg 2017; Grasswick 2010). 
Finally, Kitcher and the tutors must be reminded that expertise always 
comes in degrees, even lay people can have a certain degree of 
expertise in some domains (Collins and Evans 2007), and at least on 
occasion it is the tutors that need to be tutored by the lay experts rather 
than the other way around (Wynne 1996). 
We believe that these points and proposals, when taken into account, 
can establish sufficient grounds for trust between the tutors and the 
                                                 
12 For an overview and the evaluation of the deficit model, see Sturgis and Allum 
(2004). 
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representative citizens and contribute to the success of the Fishkin-
type deliberative polling. 
3.3 The Problem of Value Harmony 
Kitcher’s entire discussion (both of his ideal model and its 
implementation) proceeds as if condition K5 can always be 
satisfied, that is, as if it were always possible to establish a 
harmony between the values of the public and those of the 
scientists regarding the inductive risk assessment.13 We believe 
that there are situations in which this may not be the case.  
Consider, for example, the controversy regarding the (alleged) causal 
link between the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccination and 
autism.14 The causal claim was due to Andrew Wakefield’s article 
published in the prestigious medical journal the Lancet in 1998 and 
publicized at a press conference. Later on Wakefield was found guilty 
of serious scientific misconduct, struck off the medical register, and 
his paper was retracted from the Lancet. The current scientific 
consensus is that there is no evidence for the existence of a causal 
relationship between MMR vaccination and autism. Let us then 
consider the hypothesis H: “The MMR vaccine does not cause autism”. 
The inductive risks associated with H consist of accepting H as true 
when it is in fact false (false positive) and rejecting it as false when it 
is in fact true (false negative).  
While we lack data about how parents and scientists informing the 
public in the UK ranked these risks, we surmise that scientists would 
be primarily concerned with public health, whereas parents would be 
concerned with the welfare of their children. As a result, their 
                                                 
13 This assumption is made also by others who argue for the relevance of moral and 
social values in scientific research and science policy. See, for example, Wilholt 
(2013). 
14 We discuss this case in more detail in Irzık and Kurtulmus (forthcoming). For 
informative discussions of this controversy as it played out in the UK, see Boyce 
(2007) and Fitzpatrick (2004).  
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respective assessments of inductive risks would diverge. Consider the 
consequences of rejecting H when it is in fact true from the perspective 
of scientists. They have to consider not only the harms of mumps, 
measles, and rubella, but also the costs of allocating resources to 
treating the increased incidence of these diseases – resources that 
could otherwise be used to treat other diseases. Parents who are 
thinking foremost about their children's welfare need not worry about 
this.  
Herd immunity provides a further reason for the two groups to judge 
risks differently. When the rate of vaccination within a population 
reaches a certain level, those who are not vaccinated are also 
protected. Suppose herd immunity obtains. If scientists falsely reject 
H and announce it to the public, this could lead to a decline in the 
vaccination rate which could in turn undermine herd immunity. They 
would thereby be putting the whole population, including people 
who cannot be vaccinated, at risk of MMR. Under the same 
circumstances, when a parent falsely rejects H and acts on this false 
belief, they are not taking a huge risk. They can rely on herd immunity. 
On the other hand, if they accept H when H is in fact false and 
vaccinate their child, they put their child at risk of autism.  
In view of these considerations, the public and the relevant 
community of scientists could disagree about the assessment of 
inductive risks with respect to H. Therefore, condition K5 (or our C5 
for that matter) is not satisfied. Since it is a necessary condition of 
warranted trust from Kitcher’s perspective, the public trust in science 
can never be built in the MMR case even if all other conditions are 
satisfied. This conclusion is too strong. Fortunately, it can be avoided. 
Recall the distinction we made between basic and enhanced epistemic 
trust in Sect. 1. While the public may not be in a position to invest 
warranted enhanced epistemic trust, they can still have warranted basic 
epistemic trust in scientists provided that research that yields H is 
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reliable and that people have good reasons to believe that H is based 
on such research.15 
In the MMR case, a parent who has no trust in scientists and a parent 
who has only basic trust in scientists appear behaviorally identical: 
neither will vaccinate their child. Thus, it may be asked whether basic 
epistemic trust makes any difference at all. The following scenario 
illustrates the difference between complete lack of trust and having 
basic epistemic trust in the MMR case. Suppose that these people are 
not making a decision for their children but are responsible for 
determining public health policy. The parent who has no trust in 
scientists would not implement a public policy that would increase the 
vaccination rate, whereas the parent who has only basic epistemic 
trust in scientists would implement it. Thus, having basic epistemic 
trust differs behaviorally from both the case of no trust and that of 
enhanced trust.  
This is a case where the reasons one has qua parent and qua public 
official entrusted with public welfare differs. It is not surprising that 
the reasons one has as someone concerned with an individual’s 
welfare and as someone concerned with collective welfare should be 
in conflict. It is a familiar fact from collective action problems such as 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma: when each individual does what is 
individually rational, the outcome is worse for everyone. If we were 
choosing the course of action for all, we would want everyone to 
cooperate even though when we are acting individually defecting is 
the rational course of action. 
The MMR case demonstrates why it is important to have an explicit 
and nuanced analysis of the notion of public trust in science. It also 
shows that value harmony between scientists and the public regarding 
                                                 
15 When members of the public do not have enhanced epistemic trust in scientists, 
this does not entail that scientists are at fault. It is possible that in certain cases the 
public is at fault for withholding enhanced trust. In fact, John argues that parents 
who demanded higher epistemic standards than the ones employed by scientists in 
the MMR case were morally wrong to do so. See (John 2011).  
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the distribution of inductive risks may not always come about, in 
which case enhanced trust does not obtain. But this does not mean that 
the public cannot invest any epistemic trust in science at all; they can 
still enjoy a basic level of trust. It seems to us that these considerations 
can be fruitfully incorporated into Kitcher’s account. 
3.4 The Problem of Observing Value Harmony 
As we saw in Sect. 2, Kitcher requires not only that there is value 
harmony (K5), but also that the public is able to see that it obtains in 
light of their understanding of the methodological standards and 
procedures employed (K6). We pointed out that this is an unrealistic 
requirement as Kitcher himself admits, but he offers no alternative. By 
contrast, our C6 requires only that there be good reasons for believing 
that there is value harmony. What could they be? We suggest that facts 
about individual scientists and diversity among them provide such 
reasons.16 General facts about individuals such as their sex, social 
class, racial and ethnic background influence the values they hold and 
offer them different perspectives regarding the goodness or badness 
of certain outcomes. Thus, if one narrow social group is dominant 
among scientists, the judgments regarding inductive risk is likely to 
reflect their perspective and values and suffer from the blind spots 
they may have due to their social position. However, if scientists are 
drawn from different social groups, then their value judgments would 
be more likely to represent the values of the whole of society. The same 
point applies to the selection of tutors in deliberative polling. A more 
diverse group of tutors has a greater chance of gaining the trust of the 
representative citizens during the Fishkin-type deliberative process, 
which in turn facilitates healthy consensus building.  
Note that this line of reasoning is available to members of the public 
as well. They can also reason that if scientists represent all groups in 
                                                 
16 Diversity can also provide grounds for basic trust. Diversity with respect to 
gender, class, race and ethnicity can boost the reliability of research by exposing, 
eliminating or balancing biases and prejudices (Keller 1985; Longino 1990; Nielsen 
et al. 2017).   
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society, the values of their group are more likely to be taken into 
consideration than would be the case if the group they belong to were 
excluded. Moreover, the diversity or its lack within the scientific 
community is something that can be observed with relative ease. Thus, 
the diversity of the scientific community can act as a second-order 
reason that facilitates the building of enhanced trust.  
Diversity of scientists can also help address a second challenge to 
building trust. The public is not a monolithic entity and does not share 
the same history of interactions with the scientific community. Thus, 
certain groups may need more evidence of the good will and honesty 
of scientists or the reliability of their research than others who do not 
share the same history. 
Consider, for instance, the notorious Tuskegee syphilis study and its 
legacy. Four hundred African-American men were recruited into the 
study to observe the effects of syphilis in African-American males 
when it goes untreated. The subjects were not informed that they had 
syphilis. Instead, they were told that they were being treated for “bad 
blood”, an ill-defined condition referring to various health problems. 
During the course of the study, which lasted from 1932 to 1972, the 
subjects were not treated for syphilis even though penicillin’s 
effectiveness in curing the disease was established in the 1940’s. 
Condition C1 for public trust, which requires that scientists 
communicate the relevant information honestly, was obviously 
violated. When the news about the Tuskegee horror story finally 
broke, would it be surprising if the African-Americans became 
suspicious of the entire medical community? Indeed, it has been 
argued that the Tuskegee study has caused African-Americans to 
mistrust medical institutions (Epstein 2007, p. 193) and that this 
mistrust has contributed to health disparities between them and other 
social groups.17 Against a background of past injustices that have bred 
mistrust, the diversity of scientists and the composition of tutors 
                                                 
17 For a remarkable attempt to document this quantitatively, see Alsan and 
Wanamaker (2018). For related philosophical discussions of this case see Grasswick 
(2010) and Scheman (2001).  
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become significant. If members of disadvantaged communities are 
well represented in both, there will be greater chance of restoring their 
trust in scientists. A recent study lends support to this suggestion. 
Alsan and her colleagues found that African American patients were 
more likely to accept and act on medical advice when it came from 
African American doctors and this effect was more pronounced in 
subjects who had mistrust of the medical system (Alsan, Garrick and 
Graziani: unpublished). 
Nevertheless, if diversity is to have the desired effect, it should go 
beyond merely having members of different social groups within the 
scientific community; they should be in a position to influence their 
discipline. Although, as some commentators have noted, a number of 
African American medical professionals were involved in the 
Tuskegee syphilis study (Jones 2008), they had very limited power. 
Indeed, African American doctors were entirely excluded from 
institutions such the American Medical Association that have an 
influential role in guiding the profession of medicine. 18 Furthermore, 
it is naïve to expect that having a diverse body of scientists in a single 
generation can undo a long history of bias that has undermined trust 
in science. In such contexts diversity can deliver its expected benefits 
only in the long run. Restoring lost or damaged trust is often more 
difficult than building trust. 
4 Conclusion 
Ensuring that people have well-placed trust in scientists is a crucial 
goal for democratic societies that seek to treat people as free and equal 
citizens. In authoritarian societies public opinion does not have the 
same impact on social outcomes. Moreover, such societies do not have 
the same concern with respecting people’s autonomy and rationality: 
it does not matter if citizens trust scientists in light of good reasons or 
due to propaganda. Thus, if democratic societies are to have sound 
policies informed by science and at the same time maintain democratic 
                                                 
18 For the view that the roles of African Americans in the study have been 
exaggerated see Washington (2008, pp. 175-177).   
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legitimacy, conditions for well-placed trust need to be in place. 
Therein lies the significance of Kitcher’s proposals for building and 
maintaining trust.  
While a normative account, such as Kitcher’s, can find faults with 
existing societies and promote goals that are not easily attainable, the 
ideal it sets out should not be impossible to realize. We have argued 
that Kitcher’s proposal is unrealistic for a variety of reasons. Thus, if 
Kitcher’s account of were correct, warranted public trust in scientists 
would be unattainable. This would mean that democratic societies 
would have to make a very difficult choice. Either they would have to 
give up on democratic values or their policies would not be guided by 
science. Democratic societies do not have to make this choice because 
Kitcher’s (implicit) account of warranted trust is more demanding 
than is necessary. Let us briefly summarize how our account offers a 
more attainable goal while respecting some of the guiding ideas in 
Kitcher’s account.  
First, according to Kitcher value harmony is a necessary condition for 
warranted trust. Our distinction between basic trust and enhanced 
trust allows that there can be some warranted trust even in the absence 
of value harmony. Moreover, unlike Kitcher we maintain that value 
harmony is needed in a narrower set of cases, i.e., only cases where 
public welfare is at stake.  
Second, Kitcher’s account requires that people understand and accept 
the reasons scientists have for accepting scientific claims. Our account 
also maintains that people should trust scientists in light of reasons, 
but we expand the set of reasons that citizens can employ to include 
second-order reasons, thereby making warranted trust more 
attainable.  
Whether scientists are trustworthy and whether people have access to 
reasons they need to recognize the trustworthiness of scientists 
depends on the way we organize our society, science, and deliberative 
fora. There is, thus, a division of responsibility for ensuring that 
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members of the public have warranted trust in scientists. The burden 
that members of the public need to bear in this context can be 
lightened by altering the reasons available to them through different 
organizations of science and society. For instance, having a more 
diverse body of scientists that represent different social viewpoints 
would  make value harmony more likely. Such diversity can be much 
more easily observed and understood than methodological choices.  
The point about altering social conditions to make the realization of 
warranted trust easier carries over to the design of deliberative fora 
like Fishkin-type polling as well. By structuring the encounter 
between citizens and scientists in a dialogical way and by electing 
tutors whose trustworthiness is easier to observe, it is possible to make 
deliberation more conducive to the building of well-placed trust in 
science.  
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